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THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT: ALLOCATION OF THE 
EXTRAORDINARY RISK OF NUCLEAR GENERATED 
ELECTRICITY: A MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGE 
PROVISION 
David M. Rocchio* 
[I]t is not the easiest thing for a group of laypersons, such as we on 
this committee, to try to deal intelligently and with some consequence 
with the range of issues such as are presented by nuclear power. We 
are none of us scientists. We have at most a very lightly sketched 
understanding of the issues we are dealing with. Yet it is a condition 
that is presented to us; a condition not different from that which 
persons in the modern world frequently find themselves . . . . 
On the other hand, we aren't without some experience in the world 
and we try to cope . . . . What we are trying to deal with right now 
is the fact that the nuclear industry could be doomed in this country. 
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan l 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the United States enters its fourth decade with nuclear power,2 
the potential damages from an accident remain high. 3 Nuclear power 
* Solicitations Editor, 1987-1988, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
1 National Nuclear Power Plant Personnel Training Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 16 Before 
the Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public 
Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985) (opening remarks of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan 
(D. NY), ranking minority, Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation) [hereinafter Moynihan Hear-
ings]. For further evidence of Senator Moynihan's views on United States nuclear policy, see 
infra note 189. 
2 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2084 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For a 
discussion of the development of the United States nuclear power industry, see infra notes 
3, 62-124 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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is a dangerous source of electrical generating capacity.4 This danger 
is evidenced by the operating record of the nation's nuclear power 
facilities. In 1986, for instance, the Federal Department of Energy 
shut down two plutonium-producing plants at the Hanford Nuclear 
Reservation in Richland, Washington because workers were not 
observing safety standards at the facility.5 The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) has found bad management by utility companies 
to be the main ~ause of design and construction flaws in nuclear 
plants. 6 Moreover, the NRC's reticence in not requiring an Ohio 
nuclear facility to replace defective water pumps until nearly six 
years after the Three Mile Island accident resulted in a similar chain 
of events at the plant outside Toledo that had caused a near melt-
down of the reactor core at Three Mile Island. 7 These incidents show 
that, even after the Three Mile Island reactor accident in 1979, not 
enough is being done by the federal government or the nuclear 
industry to guarantee safe operation of nuclear power plants. 
Congress, through the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,8 adopted the 
policy of private development of nuclear energy for commercial use. 
Commercial generation of nuclear power, however, is hindered by 
the cost of protecting against the extreme danger posed by a nuclear 
accident. In order to encourage private commercial generation while 
also protecting the public against the dangers inherent in such gen-
eration, Congress has created a complex statutory framework. 9 
One major problem with the private development of nuclear power 
is the uninsurability of nuclear reactors against the catastrophic risk 
involved in producing nuclear generated electricity.lO Neither risk 
nor potential liability arising from a nuclear accidentll are fully cal-
4 For a discussion of fuel-cycle risk, see infra note 54. For a discussion of risk assumed by 
persons outside of the fuel-cycle, see infra note 55. 
5 N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1986, at A17, col. 2. 
6 N. Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1984, at B12, col. l. 
7 Rose & Emshwiller, Power Problems: U.S. Nuclear Industry Also Has Safety Perils, 
Three Accidents Show, Wall St. J., May 5,1986 at 1, col. 6; Wald, Congress is Told of Reactor 
Peril, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1985, at 1, col. l. 
S Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1982 & Supp III 1985). 
9 See infra notes 40-124 and accompanying text. 
10 See Buffington, The Price-Anderson Act: Underwriting the Ultimate Tort, 87 DICK. L. 
REV. 679 (1983) [hereinafter BuffingtonJ. 
11 This Comment uses "nuclear accident," "nuclear disaster," and other similar descriptive 
terms to mean an event that causes damage to any person or property, either on- or off-site 
at a nuclear facility, due to contamination by nuclear materials or a nuclear reaction at that 
site. "Nuclear incident" is used as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: 
q. The term "nuclear incident" means any occurrence, including an extraordinary 
nuclear occurrence, within the United States causing, within or outside the United 
States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, or neath, or loss of or damage to property, 
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culable. 12 Damage estimates based upon a severe nuclear accident 
near a population center range from $14 billion in property damage 
and 3,500 early fatalities to $300 billion in property damage and 
100,000 early deaths. 13 Wind, rain, and cloud patterns at the time of 
an accident may cause a tenfold increase in damages. 14 In 1957, 
Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act in an attempt to guarantee 
that the fledgling private nuclear power industry could develop nu-
clear power without assuming the high risk involved. 15 
Through the Price-Anderson Act (the Act), the federal govern-
ment indemnifies licensees of the NRC.16 The Act also places a 
arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous 
properties of source, special nuclear, or by-product material .... 
42 U.S.C. § 2014(q) (1982). 
"Extraordinary nuclear occurrence" is used as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: 
j. The term "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" means any event causing a discharge 
or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or by-product material from its intended place 
of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels offsite, which the 
[Nuclear Regulatory] Commission determines to be substantial, and which the Com-
mission determines has resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to 
persons offsite or property offsite. Any determination by the Commission that such 
an event has, or has not, occurred shall be final and conclusive, and no other official 
or any court shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such determination. The 
Commission shall establish criteria in writing setting forth the basis upon which such 
determination shall be made . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1982). 
12 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental Indemnity 
for Private Licensees and AEC Contractors Against Reactor Hazards, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 
44 (1956). See generally Buffington, supra note 10, at 686-87; Meyer, STATUTE: Regulating 
Catastrophies Through Financial Requirements: A Model State Statute, 20 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 441, 444-45 (1983) [hereinafter Meyer]; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental 
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 84 & n.28 (1977) ("there is considerable uncertainty as to the 
amount of damages which would result from a catastrophic accident"). 
13 While dollar amounts for life loss are not given, assuming a valuation of $1 million per 
human life the cost per accident would increase with each death settlement. Meyer, supra 
note 12, at 446 (citing Cohen, Society's Valuation of Life Saving in Radiation Protection and 
Other Contexts, 38 HEALTH PHYSICS 33-51 (1981)); Graham & Vaupel, Value of a Life: What 
Difference Does It Make, 1 RISK ANALYSIS 89-95 (1981). Damage estimates are easily found, 
and vary. For a discussion of likely damages, see D. Strip, Estimates of the Financial 
Consequences of Nuclear Power Reactor Accidents 4-11, NUREG/CR-2723, SAND82-1110 
(Sandia Nat'l Labs. 1982) [hereinafter Strip Report]. Others estimate far greater damage than 
do these reports. See, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE RISK OF NUCLEAR POWER 
REACTORS: A REVIEW OF THE NRC SAFETY STUDY (Aug. 1977). 
14 Meyer, supra note 12, at 446. 
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2014, 2039, 2073, 2210, 2232, 2239 (1982). See infra notes 40-124 and 
accompanying text. 
16 
The [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission shall with respect to licenses issued, ... for 
which it requires financial protection of less than $560,000,000, agree to indemnify 
and hold harmless the licensee and other persons indemnified, ... from public liability 
arising from nuclear incidents which is in excess of the level of financial protection 
required .... 
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liability cap on damages from each nuclear accident involving the 
release of fissionable material into the atmosphere. The cap is either 
the total amount of the licensee's financial protection or $560 million, 
whichever is greater. 17 The Act is intended to both protect the public 
from loss arising through nuclear accidents and to encourage private 
investment in nuclear power. 18 As passed in 1956, the Act was to 
protect the private nuclear industry for ten years, after which the 
industry was to provide for its own liability insurance. 19 Rather than 
having industry assume risks after ten years, however, Congress 
has instead reauthorized the Act. 
The most significant amendments to the Act occurred in the years 
of the Act's reauthorization, 196620 and 1975.21 The provisions of the 
1966 and 1975 reauthorizations of the Act reflect mood changes in 
42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1982). For a description of NRC licensees, see U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Licensed Operating Reactors, Status Summary Report, Data as of 05/31186, 
NUREG-0020 (1986) [hereinafter Status Summary Report] and infra note 49. Nuclear power 
plants are operating and nuclear fuel or nuclear waste is being transported in nearly every 
state. As one source indicates: 
Nuclear power plants are sited in 34 states. Shipments of nuclear materials travel 
through hundreds of communities regularly . . . . The cities of N ew York, Chicago, 
Boston, Washington D.C., Philadelphia and Detroit are closer to nuclear plants than 
the city of Kiev is to Chernobyl. Many other plants are sited near America's most 
fertile agricultural areas. An accident at one of these sites could cause tens of billions 
of dollars in damage to health, property and businesses. 
D. BERICK, K. KEHOE, & K. WELCH, A Study of Nuclear Insurance In America, (September 
28, 1986) (available from the Environmental Policy Institute, 218 D. St., S.E., Washington, 
D.C. 20003). 
17 
The aggregate liability for a single nuclear incident of persons indemnified, . . . shall 
not exceed (1) the sum of $500,000,000 together with the amount of financial protection 
required of the licensee or contractor or (2) if the amount of financial protection 
required of the licensee exceeds $60,000,000, such aggregate liability shall not exceed 
the sum of $560,000,000, or the amount of financial protection required of the licensee, 
whichever amount is greater . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 221O(e) (1982). See infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
18 
In order to protect the public and to encourage the development of the atomic energy 
industry, in the interest of the general welfare and of the common defense and 
security, the United States may make funds available for a portion of the damages 
suffered by the public from nuclear incidents, and may limit the liability of those 
persons liable for such losses. 
42 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1982). See also infra notes 72-104 and accompanying text. 
19 "[D]uring the 10-year period it is hoped that there will be enough experience gained so 
that the problems of reactor safety will be to a great extent solved and the insurance people 
will have had experience on which to base a sound program of their own .... " S. REP. No. 
296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1957). 
20 Act of Oct. 13, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2210 (1982)). 
21 Act of Dec. 31,1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, §§ 2-14, 89 Stat. 1111-1115 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982)). 
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society and Congress. While Congress clung to the hope that it had 
placed in nuclear power, each amendment to Price-Anderson pre-
sented greater attempts at public protection than did its predecessor. 
The aggregate effect of the two principal amendments was to in-
crease the level of private insurance for some reactors,22 to institute 
waivers of some defenses to suits arising from a nuclear accident,23 
and, through increased industry contribution to insurance pools, 
theoretically to end indemnification of the private industry for the 
difference between the level of financial protection and the liability 
cap.24 Unless reauthorized, the Price-Anderson provisions of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 195425 expired on August 1, 1987.26 
Congress undoubtedly will pass legislation to reauthorize the Act, 
which has become a controversial element of the Atomic Energy 
Act. 27 Yet the stated purpose of protecting the public and also lim-
iting the liability of utilities for damages following an accident28 
presents a paradox. The liability cap and indemnification pro vi-
sions,29 which are the heart of the Act, do nothing to encourage 
safety in nuclear plant operations.30 In fact, by limiting the liability 
22 See Buffington supra note 10, at 684-685; 42 U.S.C. § 221O(b) (1982). 
23 See Buffington supra note 10, at 684-685. See also 42 U.S.C. § 221O(n) (1982): 
[T]he Commission may require provisions ... which waive (i) any issue or defense 
as to conduct of the claimant ... (ii) any issue or defense as to ... immunity ... 
(iii) any issue or defense based on any statute of limitations if suit is instituted within 
three years from the date on which the claimant first knew, . . . but in no event more 
than twenty years. 
42 U.S.C. § 221O(n) (1982). See also infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
24 See Buffington supra note 10, at 685. 42 U.S.C. § 221O(b). This is, however, a semantic 
change due to Congress' proviso in 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e): "Provided, That in the event of a 
nuclear incident . . . the Congress will thoroughly review the particular incident and will take 
whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the conse-
quences of a disaster of such magnitude .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1982). The likelihood that 
Congress will react to a nuclear disaster and appropriate large sums from general revenues 
must be considered. For the language proposed by the 99th Congress' House Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, see infra note 234. 
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2014, 2039, 2073, 2210, 2232, 2239 (1982). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 221O(c) (1982). 
27 Price-Anderson has been criticized by a number of journal articles. E.g., Pratt, Cata-
strophic Nuclear Power Reactors Incidents: An Issue of Safety, A Question of Record, 14 
GA. L. REV. 265 (1980); Note, Federal Supremacy versus Legitimate State Interests in 
Nuclear Regulation: Pacific Gas & Electric and Silkwood, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 899 (1984) 
[hereinafter Note, Federal Supremacy]; Abolishing the "Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence" 
Threshold of the Price-Anderson Act, 14 J.L. REFORM 609 (1981) [hereinafter "Extraordinary 
Nuclear Occurrence"]. For an excellent discussion of the court's performance when confronted 
with the complex issues of commercial nuclear development, see Yellin, High Technology and 
the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for Institutional Reform, 94 HARV. L. REV. 489 
(1981). 
28 42 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1982). For the text of the section, see supra note 18. 
29 42 U.S.C. § 221O(e) (1982). 
30 It is beyond the scope of this Comment to criticize, catalog or discuss Congress' full role 
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of plant manufacturers, builders, and operators, little incentive ex-
ists to place a high priority upon safety and quality control by those 
producing nuclear generated electricity. 
The legal issues raised by the industry's uninsurability absent the 
intervention of a federal statute remain complex and controversial. 31 
An inability to provide adequate insurance coverage for damages 
which may arise from a nuclear accident impacts legitimate damage 
claims which may result from a nuclear accident. By limiting the 
monies utilities are required to payout following an accident, little 
incentive exists to encourage utilities to carefully manage the nuclear 
plants. This Comment focuses on whether Congress should allow 
claims for punitive damages under state tort law within the frame-
work of the Price-Anderson Act.32 The issue of punitive damages 
in encouraging the development of commercially generated nuclear electricity. This Comment 
analyses the provisions of the Price-Anderson Act and how they relate to the issue oflegitimate 
punitive damage awards. Similarly, this Comment does not purport to discuss the merits of 
the Price-Anderson Act, although it does question the logic of the Act. The Act must, at the 
very least, be amended, if not repealed and replaced with a different means of regulating and 
supplying nuclear generated electricity. 
The history of nuclear power in the United States is well documented in D. FORD, THE 
CULT OF THE ATOM: THE SECRET PAPERS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (1982) 
[hereinafter D. FORD]. Nuclear energy was first released as a result of the United States' 
war effort in World War II (WWIl). The "Manhattan Project" was the top-secret atomic 
power research and development branch of the Roosevelt Administration. The sole goal of 
the project was to develop a weapon for use in WWII. The cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
Japan were bombed with crude atomic weapons in 1946. See D. FORD, at 25-31. See also 
Buffington, supra note 10, at 686, 688; Note, Federal Supremacy, supra note 27. For a 
discussion of the likely results of a major nuclear accident, see infra notes 12-14, 53-59, 82-
91 and accompanying text. 
31 Two United States Supreme Court cases have dealt directly with the Price-Anderson 
Act. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), the Supreme 
Court held that Price-Anderson did not violate the U.S. Constitution on either due process 
or equal protection grounds. In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984), the 
Court held that the Atomic Energy Act did not preempt a punitive damage award based in 
state tort law. Silkwood has strongly worded dissents. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Silkwood 
defended federal supremacy in the nuclear arena. Justice Blackmun argued that the majority 
misconstrued the federal regulatory structure and the Court's prior Atomic Energy Act cases: 
"The Court, in my view, tortures its earlier decisions and, more importantly, wreaks havoc 
with the regulatory structure that Congress carefully created." 464 U.S. at 259. Justice 
Blackmun also attacked the Court's reasoning and logic: "Having focused on the wrong issue, 
the Court seeks to support its wrong result by focusing on the legislative history of the wrong 
statute." 464 U.S. at 269. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis, see infra notes 
126-88 and accompanying text. 
32 According to the Supreme Court in Silkwood, 
[playing both federal fines and state-imposed punitive damages for the same incident 
would not appear to be physically impossible. Nor does exposure to punitive damages 
frustrate any purpose of the federal remedial scheme . . . . 
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touches upon the goals of the Atomic Energy Act, the functioning 
of the Price-Anderson liability limitation provisions, and ultimately 
upon the appropriate means to regulate nuclear power. This Com-
ment concludes that a well-drafted provision allowing punitive dam-
ages under state law would strengthen the protection afforded the 
public through the Price-Anderson Act. 33 
It is first necessary to review the theory behind and the operation 
of the Price-Anderson Act. Included in this discussion is an exami-
nation of the scientific estimates and models used to establish risk 
involved with commercial nuclear power plants. 34 In addition, ref-
erence will then be made to the record that comprises the legislative 
history of the Act. 35 The second section presents an analysis of the 
Supreme Court's decisions that interpret the Price-Anderson Act, 
an analysis of the Atomic Energy Act, and a discussion of the 99th 
Congress' work on the Price-Anderson Act.36 Finally, given the con-
clusion that punitive damages based on state tort law should be 
allowed,37 a model punitive damage provision for the Act is pro-
posed. 38 This punitive damage provision would specifically allow state 
tort law to impose punitive damages on nuclear facilities in certain 
circumstances. 39 
II. DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION OF THE PRICE-ANDERSON 
ACT: THE THEORY OF PROTECTION AND THE LEGISLATIVE 
RESPONSE 
A. Shielding Risk, Externalizing Cost 
Regulation of risk is usually done after the initial political and 
financial decision to proceed with the development of new technol-
We conclude that the award of punitive damages in this case is not pre-empted by 
federal law. 
464 U.S. 238 at 257-58 (1984) (citations omitted). 
33 See infra Section III (C) of this Comment for a model statutory provision outlining a 
punitive damage provision. 
34 See infra notes 40-61 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 40-124 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 208-21 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 125-207 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 205-35 and accompanying text. 
39 [d. 
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ogy.40 The narrow analytical process used in initial decision making 
forces segments of society that do not directly benefit from the 
technology to carry the real costS.41 The development of nuclear 
disaster regulation is a clear example of this post hoc decision making 
process. The Atomic Energy Act of 195442 established private de-
velopment of nuclear power based upon the limited knowledge of 
members of Congress and industry. Not until three years after the 
Atomic Energy Act's passage did industry and government first 
analyze the extraordinary liability risk of nuclear energy.43 This 
analysis showed that the risk of a nuclear accident, while small, 
could not be discounted.44 Moreover, the damages from such an 
accident would be high. 45 
This failure to take into account external costs46 often results in 
technological advances and progress for society.47 This failure may, 
however, also result in unmitigated disaster.48 Ninety-three nuclear 
40 
The societal decision to build a particular facility ideally would be based upon the 
balance between all the benefits and costs of the proposed facility. Considerations 
would include the costs of the facility itself and the costs of choosing one of the 
alternatives, as well as the costs of building no facility at all. Risk costs would be 
included in the decision process, and general risk management criteria would be 
applied to all technologies. However, in the United States decisions are not usually 
based upon such broad considerations. Regulation of risk is not often done separately 
from the political and/or financial decision to go ahead with a partiCUlar project, and 
becomes a matter of reducing and managing the adverse impacts associated with the 
endeavor. 
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, An Approach to Quantitative Safety Goals for 
Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0739 (1980) [hereinafter Quantitative Safety Report]. 
41Id. 
42 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1982). 
43 The findings of this analysis did not, unfortunately, trigger a rethinking of the decision 
to privatize the industry. Instead the privatization was allowed to go forward behind the 
shield of the Price-Anderson Act. 
44 See infra note 55. 
45 Id. 
46 External costs are defined as costs not borne directly by the developer but those that are 
spread among a larger group. In the case of nuclear energy the larger group may be the 
stockholders, ratepayers, society as a whole, or the victims of a nuclear accident. Meyer, 
supra note 12, at 441. 
47 To a large extent, the major transportation networks in the United States were paid for 
by all of society. In the case of the railroads, the private carriers were allowed to operate at 
a profit based on artificially low costs due to the federal government's involvement in estab-
lishing right of way and financing the construction. Environmental damage caused by the 
construction of the railroads is incalcuable and was not a part of the equation used to determine 
whether the railroads were worth the cost. Similarly, the interstate highway system, while a 
federal project, was built for profit by private contractors. Again, the worth of the project 
was to a large extent determined without considering the environmental ramifications. In both 
cases the benefits have been so great that few in society question the original decisions to 
proceed. 
43 See infra notes 47-49, and accompanying text. 
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reactors were in commercial operation in the United States as of 
January 1987.49 These ninety-three reactors produced 77,703 mega-
watts (MWe )(N et) of electricity. 50 Three additional licensed reactors 
are in "power ascension," or permanently turned off due to accident, 
failure, or age. 51 Four reactors are licensed for fuel loading and low 
power testing. 52 The number of reactors and the variety of their 
designs make it imperative that utilities bear some of the responsi-
bility for reducing risk in the operation of nuclear plants. The NRC 
cannot adequately insure high standards of professionalism and care 
in the operation of nuclear generating reactors. 
The NRC recognizes that preventing nuclear accidents is nearly 
impossible, if for no other reason than the fact that many factors are 
beyond a plant operator's control. According to the Advisory Com-
mittee on Reactor Safety of the NRC, "the difficulty in demonstrat-
ing with a very high degree of confidence that . . . [a] large scale 
fuel melt [will not occur,] in view of the complexities introduced by 
consideration of matters such as sabotage, earthquakes, and other 
potential mUltiple failure scenarios" makes accident prevention im-
possible. 53 The production of huge amounts of electricity through a 
very clean technology when all is well54 is thus juxtaposed against 
the massive, albeit unlikely, consequences of one failure. 55 
49 Status Summary Report, supra note 16. 
50 For a basis of comparison, New England's peak one hour demand for electricity as of 
March 1987 occurred on January 26, 1987, when 17,500 megawatts (MWe) of generated 
electricity needed to be delivered at once. New England's generating capacity as of December 
31, 1986 was 23,250 MWe of electricity. The Bretton Point Coal Plant generates about 630 
MWe of electricity, and is comparable in physical size to Seabrook. Seabrook, if allowed to go 
on line, would produce about 1,150 MWe of electricity. Telephone interview with William P. 
Sheperdson, Communications Administrator, New England Power Pool (February 20, 1987). 
See also Annual Report of New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) 1985. 
51 These reactors are "plants licensed for operation which are shut down indefinitely." Status 
Summary Report, supra note 16. They are the Dresden I Reactor, the world's largest plant 
when built, Humboldt Bay, and Three Mile Island II. [d. 
52 [d. 
53 Quantative Safety Report, supra note 41, at 58. 
54 "[T]he total fuel cycle risk to the general public and plant workers was given as .59 to 
1. 7 fatalities per plant year for the nuclear fuel cycle and 15 to 120 fatalities per plant year 
for the coal fuel cycle." S. REP. No. 310, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1986) (statement of James 
W. Vaughan, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, Department of Energy). 
The nuclear fuel cycle includes mining, uranium enrichment, fuel processing and fabrication, 
power generation, fuel storage, transportation, reprocessing, and waste management. The 
coal fuel cycle contains the equivalent steps but excludes uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, 
and reprocessing. Thus, a coal plant is the dirtier and more dangerous of the two technologies 
when the plants are operating. [d. 
55 The probability of an accident resulting in total damages (meaning both personal loss and 
property damage) on the order of $60 billion (meaning that total damages would be above $6 
billion and below $600 billion) is about 111,000,000,000 per reactor year. The odds equate to 
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Lower insurance costs made possible by the Act have shifted real 
costs away from producers to the pUblic. This effect has been termed 
an externalization.56 The true costs of nuclear accidents are therefore 
not reflected in the price of nuclear energy. 57 As a result, the public 
does not consume nuclear energy at the same rate that it would if 
the price directly reflected the full cost of insuring against accidents. 
Arguably, therefore, utilities in the United States overproduce and 
energy Users overconsume nuclear generated electricity. 58 The im-
position of catastrophic loss risk59 on society, not industry, means 
that the public pays less for expensive energy now, yet will pay the 
cost of any eventual nuclear accidents. Congress' attempt to control 
the cost-benefit analysis of commerially generated nuclear electric-
ity, in part through the Price-Anderson Act, has resulted in a par-
adox. 
Harold Green has noted the paradox of Price-Anderson's dual 
goals: 
In the past, congressional consideration of the Price-Anderson 
Act and its amendments has proceeded on the tacit assumption 
that Price-Anderson is a technical measure necessary for ade-
quate protection of the public interest with respect to a technol-
ogy that exists and will inevitably grow substantially. The fact 
that the technology exists and grows only because of Price-
Anderson has been artfully concealed from public view so that 
consideration of the indemnity legislation would not trigger pub-
about a 1/333,333 chance for 100 reactors over thirty years. Meyer, supra note 12, at 446; See 
also Strip Report, supra note 13, at 4-11. 
56 U[A] cost of production is neither bome by the producer nor passed on to the consumer 
through price increases but rather is transferred to the public at large or to some sub-class 
of the public." Meyer, supra note 12, at 441. 
57 This is a failure of the market mechanism to the extent that a production cost can be 
shifted from the producer to the public at large, the cost is not reflected in the product's price. 
See id. at 442. 
Two subsidies exist within the framework of Price-Anderson. The first is an artificial 
limitation on liability. With a limitation, the taxpayer or the accident victim, depending on 
whether Congress acts to pay damages or allows victims to take a pro-rata share, not the 
responsible party, pays the damages exceeding that limit. The second subsidy allows the 
nuclear industry to avoid the full cost of insuring against nuclear disaster. K. Kehoe, UN-
AVAILABLE AT ANY PRICE, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CENTER (1980) (citing Green, Nuclear 
Power: Risk, Liability and Indemnity, 71 MICH. L. REV. 479, 501 (1983)). The average annual 
premium for insurance to cover losses to the nuclear plant itself is, on average, more than 12 
times the annual premium utilities pay for liability insurance to cover damages to the public. 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Report to Congress, The Price Anderson Act: The 
Third Decade, NUREG-0957 (1983). 
58 Meyer, supra note 12, at 443. 
59 U[I]f the costs of these catastrophic loss risks were placed upon the facility generating 
the risks, the industry in question might not exist." Meyer, supra note 12, at 453. 
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lie debate as to whether nuclear power was needed and whether 
its risks were acceptable. 60 
531 
Exposing the nuclear industry to liability for its actions, including 
liability for punitive damages, would give the public an opportunity 
to evaluate the actual cost of nuclear power as reflected in its utility 
bills. As it stands now, that cost is hidden in an obscure federal 
statute of limited protections. The legislative history of the Atomic 
Energy Act and the Price-Anderson Act make it clear that Congress 
intended the catastrophic loss risk to fall on the public only for the 
short term. 61 This risk remains with the public today, over thirty 
years after the statutory enactments. 
B. Legislative History 
In 1946 the United States government owned the most powerful 
force known to man. The atom bomb had ended the Second World 
War and was, according to the President and the Congress, going 
to remake the world in peacetime, in part by generating inexpensive 
electricity through controlled nuclear reactions. 62 As the Supreme 
Court stated in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Development Commission:63 "[t]he turning of 
swords into plowshares has symbolized the transformation of atomic 
power into a source of energy in American society."64 
This vision of nuclear power as a source of energy was first given 
form in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 65 The Atomic Energy Act 
of 1946 created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)66 and gave 
the AEC control over the government's monopoly of atomic power. 67 
The 1946 Act also created the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
60 Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability, and Indemnity, 71 MICH. L. REV. 479, 509 (1973). 
61 See supra note 19. 
62 Nuclear energy would "lead mankind into a new era of progress and peace." President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Special Message to the Congress Recommending Amendments to the 
Atomic Energy Act (Feb. 17, 1954), reprinted in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, D.D. EISENHOWER 1954, at 269, ~ 38 (1960). 
63 461 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1983). 
64 I d. at 193-94. 
65 See Atomic Energy Act of Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (current 
version codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982». 
66 42 U.S.C. §§ 2031, 2032, Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, §§ 21, 22, as added Aug. 30, 1954, 
ch. 1073, § 3, 69 Stat. 630; Act of Sept. 4, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-287, § 1, 71 Stat. 612; Act of 
Aug. 14, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-426, title III, § 305(1O)(A), 78 Stat. 423, repealed by Act of 
Oct. 11, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, Title I, § 104(a) , 88 Stat. 1237. 
67 42 U.S.C. § 2031, repealed by Act of Oc:. 11, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, Title I, § 104(a) , 
88 Stat. 1237. 
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(Joint Committee),68 which was composed of nine members from 
each house of Congress. 69 By the late 1940's, the AEC and other 
expert opinion convinced the Joint Committee that, contrary to the 
original plans for a governmental monopoly, private development of 
nuclear power would best serve the country.70 Once the Joint Com-
mittee determined to pursue private development of nuclear power, 
the Committee was soon able to work with President Eisenhower 
at rewriting the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 
President Eisenhower sent a reworked Atomic Energy Act to 
Congress shortly after his "Atoms for Peace" speech in 1953.71 The 
1953 bill called for private development of nuclear power and was 
endorsed by the Joint Committee. The Committee members' opti-
mism for private development of nuclear energy included optimism 
in safety developments. This sentiment is reflected in the Commit-
tee's 1954 statement that "[iJt is now evident that greater private 
participation in power development need not bring with it attendant 
hazards to 'the health and safety to the American people."72 The Joint 
Committee's 1954 report went on to document the great strides made 
in developing nuclear power and proclaimed that "the goal of atomic 
power at competitive prices will be reached more quickly if private 
enterprise . . . is now encouraged to [help develop nuclear power J 
"73 
N either the bill nor the Committee report discussed the issue of 
public liability.74 The strongest dissent to the Committee's action in 
creating the Atomic Energy Act was a vehement attack on the 
federal government's control of patents developed by the law. 75 This 
68 Id. § 15. 
69Id. § 15(b). See Buffington, supra note 10, at 681 (citing Temples, The Politics of Nuclear 
Power: A Subgovernment in Transition, 8 POL. SCI. 239, 243 (1980». See also H. Green & 
A. Rosenthal, GOVERNMENT OF THE ATOM-THE INTEGRATION OF POWERS (1963). 
70 S. REP. No. 1619, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo AND 
ADMIN. NEWS 3456,3457. 
71 Address by President Eisenhower Before the General Assembly of the United Nations 
on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City (Dec. 8, 1953), reprinted in PUBLIC 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, D.D. EISENHOWER 1953, at 813, ~ 256 
(1960). 
72 S. REP. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 3456, 3458. 
73Id. at 3459. The report continued, "[iJn particular, we do not believe that any develop-
mental program carried out solely under governmental auspices, no matter how efficient it 
may be, can substitute for the cost-cutting and other incentives of free and competitive 
enterprise." Id. 
7. See id. See, e.g., H.R. 9757 reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1076-
1136. 
75 S. REP. No. 1699 supra note 72, at 3487--3488. 
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shows that the Committee's focus was not on safety. Not until the 
bill had become law and the private development of the nuclear 
industry was well under way did the Joint Committee consider the 
dilemma of insuring against huge damage awards. 76 
Private industry's enthusiasm for nuclear power waned quickly as 
information about risk was developed. 77 As one commentator stated, 
"merely breaking even, let alone making a profit, lay in the relatively 
remote and uncertain future .... [Another] obstacle was the prob-
lem of potential public liability .... "78 In 1956, the Joint Committee 
held hearings to determine what catalyst could be used to get the 
Atomic Energy industry off the ground. 79 
Protection was needed against the damages caused by the release 
of "fission products"80 into the atmosphere. A release would occur 
following damage to a reactor core, caused by accident, mechanical 
failure, sabotage, operator error, war, or natural disaster.81 Fission 
material is the most toxic substance known to man. 82 Four major 
classes of public health effects are associated with nuclear accidents: 
early fatalities, early injuries, latent cancer fatalities, and genetic 
defects.83 The potential for such serious and far-reaching injuries 
76 As the Supreme Court put it, "[i]t soon became apparent that profits from the private 
exploitation of atomic energy were uncertain and the accompanying risks substantial." Duke 
Power, 438 U.S. at 63 (citing Green, supra note 57). 
77 The data began being reported in 1957 and continues to be collected through this day. 
See AEC, Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents in Large Nuclear 
Power Plants, WASH-740 (1957); AEC, Papers on Update ofWASH-740 (1964) (unpublished 
papers on file in NRC Public Document Room, Washington, D.C.); AEC, An Assessment of 
Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors: A Review of WASH - 1400 
(1975); UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS: A 
REVIEW OF WASH-1400 (1977); Meyer, supra note 12; Strip Report, supra note 13. 
78 Green supra note 76, at 480-81. 
79 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Government Indemnity for 
Private Licensees and AEC Contractors Against Reactor Hazards, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 
(1956) [hereinafter 1956 Indemnity from Hazards Hearings]. 
80 Fission products are defined as certain heavy elements (such as uranium and plutonium) 
that are split into approximately equal parts, resulting in the release of enormous quantities 
of energy. Fissionable products are highly radioactive. For a brief description of radioactivity's 
toxic effect, see infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
81 Strip Report, supra note 13, at 2-3. 
82 See generally Green supra note 57, at 481-84 (citing 1956 Indemnity from Hazards 
Hearings). See also 1956 Indemnity from Hazards Hearings (testimony of C. Rogers Mc-
Cullough) supra note 79 ; Strip Report, supra note 13, at 3-4. 
83 Id. The Strip Report's analysis of the health consequences of a nuclear accident demon-
strates why complex damages would arise following the release of fission products into the 
environment. Based on a projection model, the report describes devastating consequences: 
These are: early fatalities, early injuries and latent cancer fatalities. In addition [the 
system] ... also calculates thyroid and genetic effects, which will not be discussed 
in this report. Early fatalities are estimated on the basis of exposure to the bone 
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translates into an enormous potential liability. Due to this potential 
for tremendous liability, the small likelihood of an accident84 does 
not mitigate the private sector's inability to insure against the con-
sequences of an accident. 85 The remoteness of the risk does not 
justify ignoring the damages that could result from a disaster. 86 
marrow, lung, and gastrointestinal tract, and are observed within one year of expo-
sure. Bone marrow damage is the major contributor. The risk of early fatalities for 
a given dose is determined by a dose-response curve . . . . (at which 50% of the 
exposed population is expected to die within 60 days) .... All persons exposed to 
greater than 615 rads are assumed to have a 100% mortality rate .... 
Persons re::eiving large doses who do not die are subject to early injuries, which 
are defined as nonfatal radiation induced illnesses requiring medical attention or 
hospitalization, and include prodomal vomiting, skin illness, and immunological sys-
tem impairment . . . . The final health effect we are concerned with is latent cancer 
fatalities. Latent cancers ... are assumed to have a ten-year latency period followed 
by a period at risk for the remainder of the individual's life (except leukemia which 
has a 30 year plateau) . . . . 
Strip Report, supra note 13, at 3. 
On April 26, 1986, an accident occurred at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, in the 
Soviet Ukraine. The accident constituted the world's first actual nuclear power catastrophe, 
with substantial loss of life, widespread exposure to radiation, and serious damage to the 
environment. The radioactive release was several million times greater than the release at 
Three Mile Island. Dukakis, Statement and Press Release based upon information gathered 
by Dr. Albert Carnesale of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government (September 
20, 1986) (available from the author). The lessons from Chernobyl are applicable to the U.S. 
nuclear industry in only limited ways due to the differences in reactor types. Two lessons 
from Chernobyl relate to damages following a nuclear accident. The accident could have been 
far worse than it was. Still, the event sheds light on the likely results of a major release of 
fissionable materials into the environment. As Governor Dukakis' Press Release commented: 
First, the geographical and weather conditions at Chernobyl reduced the threat to 
life by dispersing the release over a remarkably large area, extending in diffuse form 
to places remote from the plant, rather than depositing lethal concentrations in 
population areas close to the plant. The flatness of the Ukranian plains where Cher-
nobyl is located, and the hot, dry climatic conditions prevalent in that area tended 
to keep the radioactive debris aloft for relatively long periods of time .... [D]espite 
the quality of the response, it was only because of the additional natural or fortuitous 
circumstances such as weather, geography, and altitude of the plume ... that more 
extensive immediate and long term injury was avoided. Chernobyl was in many ways 
a "best case scenario" for emergency response . . . . 
[E]ven under these conditions, thousands of residents within five miles of the plant 
suffered radioactive dosages at least eight times greater than the threshold set forth 
in federal [NRC] guidelines for immediate evacuation and 200 times greater than 
normal annual background exposure. Also, the mitigating circumstances that accom-
panied the accident and its immediate aftermath did not spare the countryside around 
Chernobyl from distressing long-term effects. Evidence suggests that areas com-
prising hundreds of square miles may remain uninhabitable for four years. The impact 
of such depopulation on public health and safety, not to mention the area's economy 
and its basic community fabric, are beyond calculation. 
ld. at 7-11. 
84 The small likelihood of reactor failure is defined supra note 55. 
85 Meyer, supra note 12, at 442. 
86 ld. at 442-47; See generally H. GREEN, THE STRANGE CASE OF NUCLEAR POWER (1957). 
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Exposure to liability for a nuclear accident could thus potentially 
bankrupt the entire nuclear power industry. 
Through the 1956 hearings, the Joint Committee tried to solve the 
problem of allocating liability for nuclear accidents while simultan-
iously maintaining a viable private nuclear power industry. The 
hearings involved coming to terms with private industry's need to 
know that, following a nuclear accident, a ceiling for potential dam-
age liability existed. The nuclear power industry regarded the lia-
bility problem as a "roadblock" to the development of nuclear elec-
tricity.87 Testifying at the 1956 hearings, Willis Gale, Chairman of 
Commonwealth Edison Company, said: "[ w]e have hoped that we 
could be assured that the risk was too remote to be considered. But 
we have not found a single expert who is willing to say that, within 
a period of years of actual experience, the hazard ... can be ig-
nored."88 
The primary purpose of the Act, as seen by the AEC, was not 
"from the standpoint of disaster insurance to protect the public .... 
[The AEC is] trying to remove a roadblock that has been said to 
interfere with getting people into this program . . . . "89 Congress 
dealt with the roadblock not by rethinking privatization of nuclear 
power, but by limiting the industry's liability following nuclear ac-
cidents. 
The Joint Committee faced a difficult task securing passage of the 
Act. If, as the AEC argued, the AEC's regulations and oversight 
were enough to guarantee the safety of the public, then the need for 
a liability cap and indemnification program became hard to justify. 90 
The dilemma was that the legislation sought could be justified only 
upon a showing that nuclear power involved extraordinary risk. To 
demonstrate this risk would have frightened the public and, poten-
tially, the Congress. 91 
The J oint Committee could not secure passage of the Act in 1956.92 
In 1957, the Committee held new hearings93 at which the industry 
threatened to withdraw from the nuclear power program if Congress 
87 Green, supra note 76, at 484. 
881956 Indemnity from Hazard Hearings, supra note 79, at 240. 
89 1956 Indemnity for Hazard Hearings, supra note 46, at 36 (testimony of Harold L. Price, 
Director, AEC, Division of Civilian Applications). 
00 Green, supra note 76, at 485. 
91Id. 
92 S. REP No. 296, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1957) reprinted in 1957 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1803. 
93 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental Indemnity 
and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1957) [hereinafter 1957 Indemnity Hearings); 
see also Green, supra note 76, at 486. 
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did not adopt a liability cap and indemnification system. 94 In the 85th 
Congress, the Price-Anderson Act was again reported out by the 
Joint Committee. 95 This time the bill passed on a voice vote after 
limited debate in the House with one member opposing passage, and 
by voice vote with no debate in the Senate. 96 
The legislative history shows a congressional willingness to protect 
the nuclear industry and a strongly voiced hope in nuclear energy. 97 
94 "At this time we do not see any sound basis on which we can risk our solvency on the 
possibility, remote as it may be, of a major nuclear catastrophe." See supra note 79, 1956 
[ndemnity from Hazard Hearings, at 240 (statement of Willis Gale, Chairman, Commonwealth 
Edison Company). 
95 See S. REP. No. 296 reprinted in, 1957 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1803. For 
Congressional statements on the 1957 passage of the Price-Anderson Act, see 103 CONGo REC. 
15,057 (1957) ("Everybody who desired to appear was given an opportunity to testify or to 
file a statement. No statement has yet been submitted to the Joint Committee opposing this 
legislation except on behalf of one association." Statement of Senator Anderson discussing the 
history of the Joint Committee hearings held on the Price-Anderson Act concluding that the 
bill had nearly unanimous support). [d. 
96 House debate is recorded at 103 CONGo REC. 10,710-10,725 (1957). The one member of 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy who dissented from the majority was Congressman 
Holifield of California. In a colloquy with Congressman Rogers of Colorado, Mr. Holifield 
responded to a defense of the liability cap by arguing that Price-Anderson would do nothing 
to protect the public. 
You were told a few minutes ago that [Price-Anderson] was not to protect the reactor 
owners. It was to protect the people. I tell you that this relieves the reactor owners 
of their liability . . . . There is only one thing that can protect you, and that is a safe 
reactor, or a reactor in an isolated position where it will not explode in the neigh-
borhood of the people who are liable to get killed. 
103 CONGo REC. 10,715. The Price-Anderson Act was adopted in the Senate on voice vote 
with no debate. 103 CONGo REC. 15,057 (1957). 
House passage is recorded at 103 CONGo REC. 15,182-15,183 (1957). 
97 Representative Carl Durham, of North Carolina, then Chairman of the Joint Committee, 
was interviewed by Mr. Dave Garroway and Mr. Frank Blain on The Today Show in 1957. 
Chairman Durham shared an optimism with the journalists for the future of nuclear power, 
and, while a number of questions dealt with keeping the United States ahead of other nations 
that had atomic reactors, no questions about safety were asked. 
On the television screen, Dave Garroway was seen in closeup seated at his regular 
desk . . . . From time to time during the interview, the Congressman was seen on 
full screen closeup . . . . 
Mr. Garroway: . . . . In 1954, Congress decided that the peacetime use of nuclear 
power should be developed by a partnership of Government and private industry. 
Now what does that mean? 
Congressman Durham: . . . . [T]o primarily assist private industry to get into the 
business of developing the atomic energy field for humanity, and for the benefit of 
the whole country. 
Mr. Garroway: I see .... Well, now, sir, the taxpayer, through the Government, 
of course, spent tens of billions of dollars to discover the secrets of the atom. Why 
did Congress decide to share these expensive secrets, instead of having the Govern-
ment make the profits which could be expected in the future? 
Congressman Durham: .... The Congress, of course, decided, and the country, 
that we had done a lot of research and development in this field, which, of course, 
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The Price-Anderson Act itself was a radical departure from the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 98 Until the passage of the Act, the 
government received indemnification from industry in exchange for 
the industry's right to use nuclear fuel which was leased from the 
federal government between 1954 and 1964. 99 In exchange for such 
leases, the licensee originally was required by statute to indemnify 
and hold harmless the United States from all claims arising from the 
use of the fuel. 100 The Act repudiated and reversed this arrange-
ment. 101 Since 1957, the federal government has indemnified its li-
censees through the Act.102 No comment about this change was 
recorded in the House debates before passage. 103 
A revealing statement by the Joint Committee helps to ascertain 
congressional intent in passing the Act. In 1957, the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy wrote that, during the ten years with the Act, it 
hoped the private industry would develop its own insurance program 
without additional federal help.104 While Congress no longer enter-
tains this thought, the fundamental structure of the Act remains the 
wa~ould be a benefit to human beings in the field of agriculture, medicine, and 
many other fields, industry primarily-and so Congress decided that it was in the 
best interest of the people to let them share in this investment, since they had 
themselves made the investment from tax sources .... 
Mr. Blair: Now, in the struggle to win the allegiance of the neutral nations, many 
of them poor in coal and oil, as you've stated, much may depend on whether the East 
or the West is first able to deliver atomic-power generating plants. Do you know if 
the Russians are capable of delivering such a plant while maybe we're still perfecting 
our test models? 
Congressman Durham: .... I don't think ... that they are anywhere near the 
point of development that we are in this country, I'm sure of that . . . . 
I think that we are developing this [Price-Anderson Act] primarily for-we're 
trying to develop reactors-where industry can come in and look at them and build 
a reactor for any company or any power company in the country that desires it, 
whether it's a cooperative, or whether it's a public power or whatever it might be, 
in the interest of development . . . . 
The Today Show: The Building of Atomic Power Reactors (NBC television broadcast, Feb-
ruary 19,1957) (transcript in 103 CONGo REC. 3,174-3,175 (1957)). 
98 The Price-Anderson Act was passed as an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 
Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982». 
99 Green, supra note 76, at 489-90 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2073(e)(8) prior to 1957 amendment 
by Price-Anderson). 
100 [d. 
101 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982). 
102 [d. For the text of this section, see supra note 16, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c). 
103 See supra note 96. 
104 See supra note 19. 
538 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:521 
same regardless of the failure of its initial mission. 105 The amount of 
time for which the Price-Anderson protections extend partly ex-
plains the importance of the indemnity provisions. Under the Act as 
originally enacted no indemnity agreements would have been en-
tered into after August 1, 1967,106 yet all "persons indemnified were 
protected for forty years, or the life of the license," according to the 
J oint Committee's 1957 report. 107 The protection of the Act thus 
extends well beyond the ten year reauthorization period. 
As recent nuclear accidents and accurate prediction models show, 
the potential liability of a nuclear accident greatly exceeds the lia-
bility cap. 108 The congressional goal of protecting the public through 
Price-Anderson is thus not met. In addition, the Act allows for the 
cost of an accident to be ignored when establishing rates. The gov-
ernment assumes the liability and thus keeps insurance rates artifi-
cially low. The cost of insurance and the cost of a potential damage 
claim are simply left out of the equation by energy planners. The 
government assumes the risk and the cost of damages, not the utility 
stockholders or ratepayers. 
In 1965, when Congress acted to reduce the government's 
liability109 and to extend the Act's coverage until 1977,110 the Joint 
Committee addressed three major concerns. First, the Committee 
was worried that state tort law did not provide adequate remedies 
for damages to all citizens because many states required findings of 
fault or negligence. 111 These elements were felt to present a nearly 
105 The provisions of the 99th Congress' legislation would have extended Price-Anderson's 
coverage for 10 years in the House's version and for 25 years in the Senate's. See H.R. REP. 
No. 636, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986). For a discussion of the 99th Congress' activity on 
Price-Anderson, see infra, notes 209-21 and accompanying text. 
106 Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat. 535 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 221O(c) (1982)). 
107 "The provisions of this bill provide governmental indemnifications to those licensees who 
obtain their licenses within 10 years. The indemnification agreement is to run for the life of 
the license." H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1957). 
108 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
109 The basic indemnity of $500 million "shall be reduced by the amount that the financial 
protection required shall exceed $60,000,000 .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1982). 
110 Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-210, §§ 1-5, 79 Stat. 855-857 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1982)). 
111 The Joint Committee adopted a waiver of defenses provision rather than create a federal 
tort: 
The approach incorporated in the bill, of authorizing the Commission to require 
waivers as to matters concerning fault and statutes of limitations, will allow achieve-
ment of the major purposes of the bill in a way which avoids the necessity of enacting 
either a Federal rule of absolute liability or a Federal statute of limitations .... If 
one were to go down the road of a Federal statute of absolute liability, we would 
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impossible burden of proof for the plaintiff to carry. Second, state 
statutes of limitation would probably invalidate claims due to the 
latency of many injuries caused by radiation. 112 Third, the Committee 
was concerned about procedural stumbling blocks that plaintiffs 
would encounter when bringing suit, such as determining an appro-
priate forum. Requiring that all claims arising from a nuclear inci-
dent be brought in a single federal district court remedied this 
problem. 113 The Joint Committee found a waiver of defense provision 
to be preferable to a federal tort. 114 
In 1975, Congress again reauthorized the Act, this time through 
1987. 115 The 1975 Amendment also gave the NRC116 the authority to 
assess nuclear licensees between $2 and $5 million in the event of a 
nuclear accident. 117 This prospective assessment reduced the amount 
... have to decide whether there was any part of State law which would continue 
to be applicable or not. 
Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Proposed Amendments to the 
Price-Anderson Act Relating to Waiver of Defenses, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 105-07 (1966) 
[hereinafter Waiver of Defense Hearings]. The waiver of defense provision Congress finally 
adopted was contingent upon the classification of a disaster as an "extraordinary nuclear 
occurrence" by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. An extraordinary nuclear occurrence is 
defined as "an event resulting in substantial offsite release of radiation and likely to result in 
significant personal injury or damage to property." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(3), 221O(n)(1) (1982). 
After the declaration of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence the waiver provisions apply. Id. 
The extraordinary nuclear occurrence designation has been unpopular and controversial from 
its beginning. Waiver of Defense Hearings, supra at 74, 75 (recording a heated exchange 
between Congressman McCulloch and Professor Arthur W. Murphy, Columbia Law School). 
See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (4th ed. 1971). For a detailed 
criticism of the extraordinary nuclear occurrence threshold, see Note, "Extraordinary Nuclear 
Occurrence," supra note 27. The NRC failed to classify the Three Mile Island accident an 
extraordinary nuclear occurrence. For a discussion of the role played by the NRC in regulating 
nuclear power producers, see Pollard, After TMI: The Lesson Unlearned, Philadelphia In-
quirer, March 28, 1983, at A 9, col. 1. 
112 Strip Report, supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
113 Waiver of Defense Hearings, supra note 111, at 105-07. 
114 See supra note 111. For an interpretation which arrives at the same result, see Duke 
Power, 438 U.S. at 65-66. 
115 42 U.S.C. § 221O(c) (1982) (originally enacted as Act of Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
197, § 4, 89 Stat. 1111-1115). 
116 The Atomic Energy Commission was abolished and all functions of the Commission, the 
chairman, members of the Commission, and the officers and components of the Commission 
were transferred to and vested in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy 
Research and Development Administration, with certain exceptions. 42 U.S.C. § 5814 (1982) 
(originally enacted as Act of Oct. 11, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233). 
117 42 U.S.C. § 221O(b) (1982) (originally enacted as Act of Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
197, § 4, 89 Stat. 1111-1115). 
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of federal indemnity by increasing the amount of private funds avail-
able for compensating victims of a nuclear accident while keeping 
the over liability cap at $560 million. 118 
The Price-Anderson Act, then, is a system of forced statutory 
guarantees and protections. While it has achieved one of its two 
stated goals-development of a private nuclear power industry-
there is no way to know whether this formula will protect the public 
after a nuclear disaster. The element of punitive damages in this 
system is, to date, not statutory. It has been established through 
litigation and judicial interpretation of statute,119 not debate and 
legislation in Congress. Congress should codify a well thought out 
punitive damage provision. 
When the Price-Anderson Act was developed in 1957, fear of an 
accident was small and faith in the industry was high. The bill's 
Senate sponsor thus felt comfortable setting the $560 million liability 
cap arbitrarily. Senator Clinton Anderson, one of the sponsors of 
the original version of the Act, described the process of choosing the 
sum by stating: 
In suggesting $500 million, I was trying to see if we could get 
some figure which would not frighten the country or the Con-
gress to death and still solve the problem which the producers 
of parts face, and which the fabricator of the entire reactor faces, 
and which the operator of that reactor would eventually face 
once he puts it in operation. 120 
According to the 1957 Joint Committee, time, oversight by federal 
regulators, and self regulation by the nuclear power industry would 
improve safety features until risk was insured solely through private 
means. 121 Modifications in the Price-Anderson Act, then, can be seen 
118 The liability cap is a nebulous concept. The relevant section states: 
(e) The aggregate liability for a single nuclear incident ... shall not exceed (1) the 
sum of $500,000,000 ... Provided, That in the event of a nuclear incident involving 
damages in excess of that amount of aggregate liability, the Congress will thoroughly 
review the particular incident and will take whatever action is deemed necessary and 
appropriate to protect the public from the consequences of a disaster of such mag-
nitude .... 
42 U.S.C. § 221O(e) (1982). The federal indemnification may reach astronomical amounts of 
money if a nuclear accident reaches the level of damages predicted, and if Congress determines 
that the appropriate and necessary step is to pay damages unavailable from the utility 
companies and which the government has agreed to pay. 
119 See infra notes 130-225 and accompanying text. 
120 Governmental Indemnity and Reactor Safety Hearings Before the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1957). 
121 See supra note 19. The NRC is often criticized for being a captive agency. In a 1986 
WALL STREET JOURNAL article it was reported that: 
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as efforts to make an unrealistic goal realistic: protecting the public 
after a disaster (with damages potentially reaching billions of dollars) 
by actually limiting the amount of damages collectable and indem-
nifying the industry's risk. l22 
The Committee reports, hearing records, and the statutory lan-
guage of past Price-Anderson action suggest that the Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy based its conclusions on subjective criteria in 
order to achieve a previously determined goal of privately developed, 
nuclear generated electricity for household use. l23 The subjective 
[R]egulators just don't seem willing to insist that safety improvements be made. 
Before the [June 1985] accident at Davis-Besse [in Toledo, Ohio], the NRC had 
identified the need for an additional backup cooling pump. Toledo Edison disagreed 
and the "NRC never felt strongly enough to just say 'put the pump in'," says Joe 
Williams, senior vice president for nuclear operations at the utility. So the pump 
wasn't installed. 
When the accident happened last June, both of the normal cooling pumps failed, 
and the only thing available was a small pump not designed for the job. Only 
"outstanding performance" by plant operators averted likely damage to the plant's 
nuclear-fuel core from overheating .... 
Wall S. J., May 5,1986, at 1, col. 6. In an assessment of the NRC in the WASHINGTON POST, 
a number of instances were reported where NRC investigations dealt lightly with utilities. 
"NRC officials say it is unrealistic to expect a hard-nosed approach from the commission's 
staff, which is under considerable pressure to process utility licenses. 
"[T]he commission's shortcomings [are blamed] on 'a wellmeaning desire to see nuclear 
power succeed.'" Washington Post, April 8, 1986, at AI, col. 6. 
122 In 1957 the AEC commissioned the first comprehensive study of risk associated with the 
operation of nuclear power plants. The report concluded that the worst case scenario based 
on the 1950's demographics and reactor specifications would result in a maximum 3400 deaths 
and 43,000 injuries, with $7 billion in property damage. AEC, Theoretical Possibilities and 
Consequences of Major Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants, WASH-740. See also supra 
note 77. In 1964 members of the Joint Committee suggested that WASH-740 be updated. It 
was assumed that the update would conclude a lowering of risk due to improved safety 
measures. The data, however, showed that increases in scale and changes in the sitings of 
reactors had increased risk to a worst case of 45,000 early deaths, contamination of 1,863 
square miles of land and $18 billion in property damage. AEC, Papers on Update of WASH-
740 (1964) (available at the NRC Public Document Room, Washington, D.C.). See also Jacks, 
The Public and the Peaceful Atom: Participation in AEC Regulatory Proceedings, 52 TEX. 
L. REV. 466, 470 n.7 (1974). With this information in hand, the members of the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy based the liability cap of the Price-Anderson amendments on 
subjective values such as ease of passage, sense of security provided the industry, and 
confidence that an accident would not occur. The much maligned Reactor Safety Study (RSS) 
of 1975 set its conservative worst-case estimates at 3,300 early deaths, 45,000 early illnesses 
and $14 million in property damage. NRC, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident 
Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, WASH-1400, NUREG-75/014 (Oct. 1975). 
For an update of the RSS, see Strip Report, supra note 81. See generally supra notes 77, 
120 and accompanying text. 
123 Green, supra note 76, at 480. See also Selected Materials on Atomic Energy Indemnity 
Legislation, Subcomm. on Legislation of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess. 1, III-IV (1965) ("It would be difficult to overestimate the beneficial impact which 
this legislation has had .... Tremendous strides have been made since 1957 in the field of 
generating electricity by nuclear power plants, and these accomplishments are due ... to the 
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criteria Congress used in developing the Price-Anderson Act in-
cludes faith in the technology, belief that the possibility of a nuclear 
accident was extremely remote and thus the liability cap could be 
arbitrary and small, and the political reality that the Act should be 
passable in Congress as well as comforting to the public. 124 The 
passage of time has disproven these beliefs. 
By first looking at the Supreme Court's interpretation of Price-
Anderson, and finally analyzing the competing policy goals and pres-
sures within the Act, the best role for punitive damages within the 
system can be defined. 
C. Judicial Interpretation of Price-Anderson 
Three major cases form the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
Price-Anderson. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental 
Study Group, Inc.,125 the Supreme Court held that the provisions of 
Price-Anderson were constitutional because the Act provided rem-
edies to victims of a nuclear accident. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 
v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commis-
sion,126 the Supreme Court held that, while the states may not 
regulate the safety of a nuclear reactor, the states do have a fun-
damental interest in deciding whether to pursue nuclear power. 
Furthermore, the Court held that state law plays an integral role in 
the "complex scheme to promote the civilian development of nuclear 
energy,"127 thus laying the groundwork for the Court's later holding 
in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee COrp.l28 Silkwood went further than 
either Duke Power or Pacific Gas & Electric, and held that state 
tort law governs the awarding of damages following a nuclear acci-
dent, that awarding punitive damages is not contrary to federal 
public policy or federal statute, and was therefore not preempted. 129 
cooperation of private industry with the U. S. Government in the program---cooperation which 
the Price-Anderson Act permitted and fostered.") (joint statement of Chet Holifield, Chair-
man, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and John O. Pastore, Chairman, Subcomm. on 
Legislation). 
124 See supra note 120 and accompanying text; Green, supra note 76, at 498-502. 
125 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
126 461 U.S. 190 (1983). See also Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minnesota, 447 F.2d 
1135, 1143 (8th Cir. 1971) a/I'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (states are preempted from 
regulating the safety of nuclear generating facilities due to the pervasive federal regulatory 
scheme in the area of nuclear safety pursuant to the supremacy clause of the United States 
Constitution). 
127 461 U.S. at 194. 
126 464 U.S. 238 (1984). 
129 I d. at 258. 
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1. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. 
The Supreme Court in Duke Power130 held that the Price-Anderson 
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act were constitutional. 131 The 
plaintiff (respondent) argued that the Price-Anderson Act's remedial 
scheme violated the due process clause. 132 Price-Anderson, the plain-
tiff argued, arbitrarily changed the plaintiff's property rights by 
creating the source of the underlying injury and limiting the recovery 
arising from the injury.133 The Supreme Court accepted the district 
court's finding that, without the Price-Anderson protections, no nu-
clear power industry would exist. According to the Supreme Court 
in Duke Power, there exists "a 'substantial likelihood' that the ... 
nuclear plants would be neither completed nor operated absent the 
Price-Anderson Act . . . . "134 
Although the Supreme Court accepted the finding that without 
Price-Anderson there would be no nuclear power industry, the Court 
based its holding on the recognition of Congress' right, with which 
the Court would not interfere, to establish an economic regulation. 135 
The Court would "defer to the congressional judgment unless it is 
demonstrably arbitrary or irrational. "136 The Court then went on to 
hold that "[ w ]hen examined in light of this standard of review, the 
Price-Anderson Act ... passes Constitutional muster."137 Once the 
Court decided that limiting liability was not arbitrary or irrational, 
the Court stated that whether the $560 million liability ceiling itself 
was rational was beyond the point. The Court stated: 
Given our conclusion that, in general, limiting liability is an 
acceptable method for Congress to utilize in encouraging the 
private development of electric energy by atomic power, candor 
130 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
131 [d. at 84. 
132 [d. at 69. 
133 Paragraph 19 of the complaint reads in part: 
Since the Price-Anderson Act provides the victims of a nuclear disaster no benefit 
while at the same time limiting their right to recovery for their losses to approxi-
mately [two and one half percent] of such losses, the ... $500 million limitation 
would, in the event of a nuclear disaster, deprive the persons injured ... of property 
rights .... 
[d. at 68 n.12. 
134 [d. at 75. See also id. notes 21-22. 
135 [d. at 84-85. 
136 [d. at 84. "It is by now well established that [such] legislative Acts ... come to the 
Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a 
due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational 
way." [d. (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. I, 15 (1976». 
[37 438 U.S. at 84. 
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requires acknowledgement that whatever ceiling figure is se-
lected will, of necessity, be arbitrary .... This is not, however, 
the kind of arbitrariness which flaws otherwise constitutional 
action. 138 
Because of the federal safety standards and the potential damages 
that a utility would face following a nuclear accident, the Court found 
sufficient safeguards against creating a cavalier industry. 
The relevance of Duke Power to the issue of punitive damages 
derives from the Court's reasoning that the federal indemnification 
system, and the liability cap, do not encourage the builders and 
owners of nuclear power plants to act irresponsibly.139 According to 
the Court, Price-Anderson does not violate the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the fifth amendment because sufficient remedies 
remain in the event of a nuclear accident. The Court found that the 
federal government's scheme guaranteed a responsible industry, pro-
tection of individual rights, and adequate compensation following an 
accident. 140 This conclusion was predicated on existing state tort law 
remedies that in many instances include provisions for payment of 
punitive damages. Congress determined that state law would apply. 
Congress only modified state tort law by taking away defenses in 
some instances and setting a cap on awards, not by taking away 
causes of action.141 Thus, under the reasoning in Duke Power, a 
victim of a nuclear accident still has a cause of action for punitive 
damages. 
2. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Development Commission 
Another important Atomic Energy Act case decided by the Su-
preme Court was Pacific Gas & Electric. 142 The Court's federal 
preemption analysis in Pacific Gas & Electric led directly to the 
Court's holding a year and a half later in Silkwood. 143 In Pacific Gas 
& Electric, the issue was whether a state's decision to deny permis-
sion to build a nuclear power plant was regulation of safety which is 
a domain reserved to the federal government through the Atomic 
Energy Act. 144 The State of California passed a statute which pro-
138 Id. at 86 (footnote omitted). 
139 I d. at 87. 
140 Id. at 87-88. 
141 Id. at n.33. 
142 461 U.S. 190 (1983). 
143 464 U.S. 238 (1984). 
144 461 U.S. at 194-95. 
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hibited construction of nuclear power plants in the state until the 
federal government developed adequate regulatory standards for the 
permanent disposal of radioactive waste. 145 The state argued that its 
motive was economic, not safety related, and was therefore not 
preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. 146 
The Court agreed with the state. While the Court discussed at 
length the hazards associated with nuclear waste and the risk created 
by spent nuclear fuel, the Court held that California's stated eco-
nomic motive was not clearly pretextural. California's decision to 
ban new nuclear construction until the spent fuel issue is resolved 
was thus not preempted by federal law. 147 The Court went on to hold 
that Congress, in passing and reauthorizing the Atomic Energy Act, 
did not intend to entirely displace state regulation. 148 In so holding, 
the Court stated that "[e]ven a brief perusal of the Atomic Energy 
Act reveals that, despite its comprehensiveness, it does not at any 
point expressly require the States to construct or authorize nuclear 
powerplants or prohibit the States from deciding ... not to permit 
... any further reactors. "149 
Thus, the importance of Pacific Gas & Electric resides in its 
bolstering of the contention that Congress, throughout its consid-
eration of the Atomic Energy Act, felt that the states and the federal 
government were partners in the regulation of federally licensed 
nuclear facilities. 150 
The Court summed up federal nuclear policy as a "complex scheme 
to promote the civilian development of nuclear energy, while seeking 
to safeguard the public and the environment from the unpredictable 
risks of a new technology. "151 The Court also described the function-
ing of the relationship between the federal and state authority in 
the nuclear power area: "[t]he interrelationship of federal and state 
authority in the nuclear energy field has not been simple; the federal 
regulatory structure has been frequently amended to optimize the 
partnership. "152 
145 [d. at 195-97. 
146 [d. at 213. 
147 [d. at 207-09 and nn.18-20. 
148 [d. at 205. 
149 [d. 
150 [d. at 194. "Thus, Congress legislated here in a field which the States have traditionally 
occupied . . . . So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose 
of Congress." [d. at 206 (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
151 461 U.S. at 194. 
152 [d. (emphasis added). 
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Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Pacific Gas & Electric153 
defines the field of federal preemption in even narrower terms than 
does the majority.l54 According to Justice Blackmun, if a state can 
decide how best to meet its energy needs, then the state should be 
allowed to consider all relevant factors when making the decision, 
including safety.155 The determining factor for Justice Blackmun is 
whether a state has granted permission to build a nuclear reactor, 
not whether denying the permission was based upon safety. 156 Justice 
Blackmun argued that the state has the power to decide whether or 
not the plant should be built, but "if the decision is to permit con-
struction, the subsequent determination of how to construct and 
operate those plants" is for the federal government. 157 
Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority that the petitioner's 
premise that Congress intended the state to accept nuclear power 
was flawed. l58 He argued that Congress intended to give the state 
the opportunity to use nuclear power if demand existed for the new 
form of energy and if the state was willing to accept the risk. 159 
Using Justice Blackmun's reasoning, the State of California was thus 
acting within its power when it applied state law to prohibit the 
construction of nuclear plants due to the state's concern about "ad-
equate capacity" for the spent nuclear fuel. 160 The moratorium on 
the certification of new plants until "there has been developed . . . 
a demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of high level 
nuclear waste"161 was, according to Justice Blackmun, within the 
153 461 u.S. at 223 CBlackmun, J., cohcurring). 
154 [d. at 224. "Congress has occupied iiht the broad field of 'nuclear safety concerns' but 
only the narrower area of how a nuclear phiht should be operated to protect against radiation 
hazards." [d. 
155 [d. at 226-27. 
156 [d. at 225-26. 
157 [d. 
158 [d. at 226. "Congress has not evidenced a dictatorial intent for every state to build 
nuclear powerplants." [d. at 227 (quoting Note, Maya State Say "No" to Nuclear Power? 
Pacific Legal Foundation Gives a Disappointing Answer, 10 ENVTL. L. 189, 199 (1979) 
(attacking the lower court ruling in Pacific Gas & Electric, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981) which 
was overturned by the Supreme Court's opinion)). 
159 461 U.S. at 227. "Congress did not compel States to give preference to the eventual 
product of that industry or to ignore the peculiar problems associated with that product. " [d. 
160 [d. at 197. 
161 [d. at 198 (quoting California's Warren-Alquist Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. 
§§ 25524.l(b) & 25524.2 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983)). The Court held that only § 25524.2 was 
ripe for judicial review, but that § 25524.l(b) was not ripe for review only because "we cannot 
know whether the Energy Commission [of the State of California] will ever find a nuclear 
plant's storage capacity to be inadequate" and thus "judicial consideration of this provision 
should await further developments." 461 U.S. at 203 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Energy 
Resources Comm'n., 659 F.2d at 918 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
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state's control not only because of economic concerns but also be-
cause of the state's legitimate concern about risk. 162 
To extrapolate from this holding, a state's right to control the 
generation of power within its borders includes the right to employ 
state law in controlling the breach of its laws, but not the regulation 
of safety. The majority suggests that a state should control the 
economic risks flowing from conduct at nuclear power facilities and 
in the design, construction and operation of nuclear power facilities. 
Justice BIackmun goes beyond this and argues that, when deciding 
whether to allow construction of a facility, a state should be able to 
consider all types of risks, including safety risks. To carry this 
argument a step further, in order to evaluate the acceptibility of risk 
posed by the facility, the state should be allowed to examine how its 
laws affect that risk, including what deterrent effect a state's tort 
laws may have in preventing negligent management of nuclear fa-
cilities. Whether a state's laws would then survive a constitutional 
challenge under the supremacy clause depends on the Supreme 
Court's preemption analysis. 
The Pacific Gas & Electric Court's preemption analysis has three 
elements. Within constitutional limits, Congress may preempt state 
authority expressly,163 through pervasive regulation that infers an 
intent to preempt any state laws on the same subject,l64 or when 
federal and state law applied together would frustrate a federal 
purpose. 165 The Court found none of these conditions in Pacific Gas 
& Electric. 
3. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 
When the Supreme Court asked a similar preemption question in 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee,166 the Court again found a partnership 
between federal and state law, not a conflict.167 In Silkwood, Karen 
162Id. at 226-27. 
163 461 U.S. at 203. 
164 Id. at 204. 
165Id. 
166 464 U.S. 238 (1984). 
Last term, this Court ... concluded that States are precluded from regulating the 
safety aspects of nuclear energy .... This case requires us to determine whether a 
state-authorized award of punitive damages arising out of the escape of plutonium 
from a federally licensed nuclear facility is pre-empted either because it falls within 
that forbidden field or because it conflicts with some other aspect of the Atomic 
Energy Act. 
[d. at 240-41. 
167 I d. at 258. 
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Silkwood was a laboratory analyst for Kerr-McGee. 168 In 1974, Kerr-
McGee's routine contamination check indicated that Silkwood had 
been severely contaminated by plutonium over a three day period. 
Investigation showed that the contamination came from her apart-
ment, which was laced with radioactive plutonium. 169 Conflicting 
evidence as to whether Kerr-McGee violated federal regulations in 
the handling of radioactive material was resolved by a jury in favor 
of Silkwood's estate.17O 
A jury returned a verdict in favor of Silkwood, finding actual 
damages of $505 thousand and punitive damages of $10 million.l7l 
Kerr-McGee moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
contending that compliance with federal regulations precluded an 
award for punitive damages. In denying this motion, the district 
court held that Kerr-McGee had a duty to maintain the release of 
radiation to an "as low as reasonably achievable" standard. 172 To 
Kerr-MeGee's argument that, since only a small amount of radioac-
tive material was released, Kerr-McGee could not be found liable, 
the district court answered that meeting a federal standard did not 
foreclose liability. The court stated that "[c]ompliance with this [as 
low as reasonably achievable] standard cannot be demonstrated 
merely through control of escaped plutonium to within any absolute 
amount."173 The Tenth Circuit, however, reversed the district court 
and held that the award of damages was contrary to federal law and 
thus was preempted. It further held that since no violation of federal 
regulation had taken place, there was no liability.174 
Reversing the Tenth Circuit's broad preemption analysis,175 the 
Supreme Court developed further the Pacific Gas & Electric 
preemption test. In Silkwood, the Court found that the federal 
government's preemption of the field of atomic energy was not com-
plete.176 The Court held that the lack of a federal remedy for persons 
injured by conduct supporting an award of punitive damages, 177 




172 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 585 (W.D. Okla. 1979). 
173 464 U.S. 238, 245 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. at 603). 
174 667 F.2d 908, 923 (10th Cir. 1981). 
175 [d. "[Alny state action that competes substantially with the AEC [now NRCl in its 
regulation of radiation hazards associated with plants handling nuclear materials" is 
preempted. [d. 
176 [d. at 250-51. 
177 [d. at 251. "Congress had no intention of forbidding the States to provide such remedies." 
[d. 
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coupled with the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act and 
the Price-Anderson Act, evidenced that state tort remedies contin-
ued to exist. 178 Price-Anderson modified state tort law only in that 
it guaranteed that relief in a suit arising out of a nuclear accident 
would be equitably distributed,179 an action easily brought,180 and, 
following amendments in 1966 and 1975, quickly resolved. 181 Price-
Anderson protects the interests of private industry from awards 
based upon actual damages in excess of the liability cap, nothing 
more. Only when industry behavior is not culpable or when the Price-
Anderson liability cap is reached, or both, is state tort law affected 
by federal law. 182 
According to the Silkwood Court, federal regulation of nuclear 
power occurs on two levels. l83 First, once a state grants permission 
to build a nuclear power plant, specific safety regulations that control 
the entire operation of a plant, from design through construction to 
operation, are within the federal domain. l84 Second, the distribution 
of liability for injuries caused by a nuclear accident is a federal 
concern as well, pursuant to the Price-Anderson Act. 185 Through 
these two arms of regulation, Congress theoretically achieves its 
dual goal of encouraging private industry and protecting the pub-
lic. 186 
178 See supra notes 92-107 and accompanying text. Silkwood involves a case where Price-
Anderson's award limitation provision is not imposed and the Joint Committee stated in 
supporting the language of the Act that: 
there is no interference with the State law until there is a likelihood that the damages 
exceed the amount of financial responsibility required together with the amount of 
the indemnity. At that point the Federal interference is limited to the prohibition of 
making payments through the State courts and to prorating the proceeds available. 
S. REP. No. 296, 85th Congo 1st Sess. 9 (1957). 
179 42 U.S.C. § 2210(m) (1982). 
180 [d. § 221O(n). 
181 [d. 
182 [d. 
183 464 U.S. at 252. "Congress clearly began working on the Price-Anderson legislation with 
the assumption that in the absence of some subsequent legislative action, state tort law would 
apply .... Congress was fully aware of the Commission's exclusive regulatory authority over 
safety matters." [d. at 252-53. 
184 461 U.S. at 213. 
185 For accidents below the liability cap it is doubtful that the NRC would ever term an 
incident an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. The NRC's criteria for defining an incident as 
extraordinary is set out at 10 C.F.R. §§ 140.81-140.85 (1986). The regulation is in response 
to 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1982) and 42 U.S.C. § 221O(m) (1982). The damages resulting from an 
extraordinary nuclear occurrence would by definition include radioactive poisoning outside of 
the plant. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1982). The costs associated with such a release are staggering. 
See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text. 
186 Only through an extraordinary nuclear occurrence would the theory be proven since the 
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According to the Court's interpretation of Price-Anderson, how-
ever, assessing liability for accidents with damages below the Price-
Anderson liability cap is governed by state tort law. 187 The Silkwood 
Court stated that "Congress assumed that persons injured by nu-
clear accidents were free to utilize existing state tort law remedies" 
below the extraordinary nuclear occurrence threshold. l88 Designat-
ing a nuclear facility as "safe" by federal standards does not guar-
antee that those involved in the operation of that nuclear plant will 
not act negligently or with reckless disregard. 189 The NRC has pro-
vided specifically for punitive damage awards in its regulations.l90 
The Court is thus correct in holding that Congress intended to 
provide for both state remedies and federal regulation. 191 
The second element of the Court's analysis shows that no conflict 
exists between awarding punitive damages and the NRC's federal 
authority192 to impose civil penalties for violation of safety regula-
Price-Anderson interference with state law is only triggered by terming an accident an 
extraordinary nuclear occurrence. 42 U.S.C § 221O(m) (1982). 
187 464 U.S. at 252. 
188 [d. The Court also concluded that "Congress assumed traditional principles of state tort 
law would apply with full force unless they were expressly supplanted." [d. at 255. 
189 [d. at 253. 
When it enacted the Price-Anderson Act, Congress was well aware of the need for 
effective national safety regulations. In fact, it intended to encourage such regulation. 
But, at the same time, 'the right of state courts to establish the liability of the persons 
involved in the normal way [wasl maintained.' 
[d. (quoting S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1957». Compliance with federal 
standards is not the only measure of safety. The lead of a Boston Globe article alleged 
"[wlorkers building the Seabrook nuclear power plant often used alcohol and drugs at work, 
according to more than two dozen police, prosecutors, physicians, court employees and former 
Seabrook construction workers ... ." Tye, Drug, Alcohol Use at Seabrook Described, Boston 
Globe, Nov. 7, 1986 at 1, col. 1. Safe, in the sense of approved for operation, cannot guarantee 
the responsible behavior of workers and managers nor can it prevent costly errors. Senator 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D. NY), stated the dilemma succinctly: "Despite the renewed 
emphasis on safety by the NRC [andl the utilities ... we still have plants with long standing 
maintenance problems. And we still have operators who push buttons when they ought to 
keep their hands in their pockets and vice-versa." Moynihan Hearings supra note 28. See 
also Pollard, supra note 111, at A 9, col. 1. 
190 10 C.F.R. § 140.91. 
Following the 1966 amendment, the Commission published a form for nuclear energy 
liability policies and indemnity agreements. After reciting the waivers being made 
by the licensee in the event of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, the form contains 
the following provision: 'The waivers set forth ... above do not apply to ... [alny 
claim for punitive or exemplary damages ... .' 
464 U.S. at 255, n.17 (citing 10 C.F.R. § 140.91, App. A, ~ 2(c), at 801 (1983». 
191 For a contrary view, see Casenote, Punitive Damages Award Against Nuclear Power 
Company Threatens Exclusivity of Federal Control; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 26 B.C.L. 
REV. 725 (1985). 
192 See 464 U.S. at 257. 
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tions. 193 The federal regulatory system provides for civil penalties 
when federal standards are breached. 194 State punitive damages 
come into play when a defendant's behavior is culpable enough to 
mandate punishment, not when regulatory standards are 
breached. 195 Having two standards of review does not cause an im-
possibility of compliance. 196 In the Atomic Energy Act, Congress 
provided that the development of nuclear energy should be encour-
aged "only to the extent it is consistent 'with the health and safety 
of the public. "'197 Furthermore, in Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court 
held that culpable behavior on the part of the producers of nuclear 
energy should not go unpunished solely because the federal govern-
ment is a promoter of nuclear power. 198 Finally, a jury is capable of 
determining whether behavior is cUlpable. Based on this analysis, 
no conflict appears between awarding punitive damages based upon 
state law, and state legal systems are not capable of reviewing a 
case dealing with the results and causes of a nuclear accident. 
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Silkwood argues that Congress has 
determined that states are incapable of handling the technical as-
pects of regulating nuclear power. According to the Justice, "[s]tates 
[are] without the technological expertise necessary to regulate [nu-
clear power] . . . . Yet the Court concludes that Congress intended 
to allow a jury to impose substantial penalties . . . for failure to 
follow what the jury regards as [in]adequate safety procedures. "199 
Justice Blackmun, however, misconstrues the role of a jury in an 
action for punitive damages. The jury's importance is not in passing 
on the regulatory rules or the complexities of nuclear power,200 but 
193Id. 
194 42 U.S.C. § 2282 (1982). 
195 For a discussion of tort theory, see supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
196 464 U.S. at 257-58. For a discussion of the Court's analysis of the provision, see supra 
note 29. 
197 464 U.S. at 257 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1982)). 
198 461 U.S. at 222. "[T]he promotion of nuclear power is not to be accomplished 'at all 
costs'." Id. 
199 464 U.S. at 259. 
200 The process for generating nuclear electricity is not difficult to understand. For a general 
description of how nuclear reactors work, see CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON 
RESOURCES, LAND USE AND ENERGY, Reassessment of Nuclear Energy in California: A 
Policy Analysis of Proposition 15 and its Alternatives, 67-69 (1976). Highly toxic radioactive 
fuels are used in a reactor "core" to make up pencil-thin "fuel-rods." See id. at 15. A nuclear 
chain reaction is allowed to take place, where the heavy, unstable atoms are freed to split, 
generating heat. Id. at 14. As with any other steam turbine system, the heat from the reactor 
(or furnace) is used to boil water which turns turbines to manufacture electricity. Id. Escaping 
radiation is trapped by the rods in which the fuel is stored. A neutron-absorbing substance is 
used to control the reaction. Id. Dropping "control-rods" of this substance into the reactor 
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is in finding whether a defendant committed an egregious act that 
causes harm. 201 The determination of wrongful behavior is not a 
technological one. Rather, it is a role for which juries are suited. 202 
In fact, Justice Blackmun himself recognized that the states must 
have a role in regulating nuclear power when he wrote in Pacific 
Gas & Electric "[t]here is, in short, no evidence that Congress had 
core stops the reaction, or "scrams" the reactor. [d. Dropping the control rods, however, 
generates more heat initially than does the reaction. [d. Cores are cooled with water. Failure 
of the water cooling systems can result in a "meltdown" of the reactor core and the concrete 
containment building in which the reactor is wrapped. [d. 
In 1957 Congressman Holifield described the process in simpler terms to his colleagues: 
The first question is, what takes place in an atomic reactor? Atoms are split, which 
causes heat in a process called a chain reaction, which is under control. 
What takes place inside an atom bomb when it explodes? Atoms are split in a 
noncontrolled chain reaction. Uncontrolled they are allowed to run wild. 
What happens regarding radioactivity in both cases? Both a bomb and a reactor 
create radioactivity, deadly radioactivity, that can go through several feet of concrete 
and steel. In a reactor you contain the radioactivity behind walls of concrete, steel, 
or lead. In a bomb you release the radioactivity into the environment. As long as the 
controls work on a reactor, you are going to contain that radioactive material inside 
this reactor . . . . 
The inside of a reactor becomes contaminated to a degree equivalent to the con-
tamination of a bomb. As long as it is behind those walls it is safe. If that reactor 
gets out of control . . . [radioactive material] is spread over the environment for 
many miles, possibly many hundreds of miles, and carried downwind on the breeze 
That is why the insurance companies will not cover these reactors to the extent 
that the people who are building them want them covered. They do no[t] know. They 
sell their insurance on the basis of tables of experience. That is free enterprise and 
it should be that way. But 139 American insurance companies backed up by an 
agreement with Lloyds of London have said, "We will not write any more than $60 
million of insurance." 
103 CONGo REC. 10,714 (1957). 
201 Deciding whether a nuclear reactor is "safe," and defining what "safe" means, when 
regulating nuclear reactors is highly technical and the decision making process demands high 
levels of expertise. Furthermore, nuclear energy generation is a national industry with nu-
merous reactor designs and more than one manufacturer. Thus it makes sense to have a 
central regulatory structure where expertise is concentrated and national standards set. On 
the other hand, once safety standards are achieved and applied, whether the safety standards 
have been breached is an ascertainable fact that laymen are capable of deciding. Whether 
breached through actions or behavior so culpable as to justify punishment is also ascertainable 
by a lay jury. In other words, the NRC sets regulatory standards and sees that the standards 
are enforced. This is the job of the NRC and the sole domain of the federal government. A 
breach of safety standards which leads to other actionable offenses does not upset the federal 
law. Judging whether grossly negligent, wrongful, or otherwise culpable behavior is the cause 
of a breach of regulations is not a technical decision nor is it safety regulation. See e.g., 
Northern States Power, 447 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). 
202 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development 
Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 225 (1982). 
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a 'clear and manifest purpose' . . . to force States to be blind to 
whatever special dangers ,are posed by nuclear plants. "203 
The purpose of federal nuclear safety regulation is to protect the 
health and safety of the public. 204 The goal of punitive damages is to 
atone for an act that mayor may not violate those safety standards. 
What the Supreme Court has achieved through its holdings in Duke 
Power,205 Pacific Gas & Electric,206 and Silkwood,207 is a complicated 
balance between federal, state, and private rights and interests in 
the area of nuclear generated electrical power. 
D. Recent Congressional Action in Preparation of 
Reauthorization and in Reaction to the Supreme Court's 
Interpretation of the Price-Anderson Act 
Recent events, such as the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nu-
clear accidents, and general changes in societal values have given 
Congress a broader perspective on a variety of issues, including 
nuclear power. Committees in both Houses in the 99th Congress 
held extensive hearings and issued reports on the pending reauthor-
ization of Price-Anderson. 208 Congress did not pass reauthorization 
legislation in either House during the 99th Congress, yet Congress 
laid the groundwork for lawmaking in the lOOth Congress. By ex-
amining the work of the various congressional committees, one may 
ascertain the Congress' sense of the role for punitive damages in the 
regulatory scheme. 
The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources re-
ported out a bill in the 99th Congress209 to reauthorize the indem-
nification scheme for 25 years, increase the amount of funds readily 
available to compensate victims, provide for the gradual increase of 
the liability cap, and broaden the scope of the provision to cover 
nuclear waste disposal concerns and nuclear incidents involving theft 
203 464 u.s. at 257. 
204 Id. 
205 461 U.S. 190 (1982). 
206 464 U.S. 238 (1984). 
207 Hearings were held in a number of different congressional committees because in 1976 
the Joint Committee was abolished. Its duties were spread among the House Committees on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, Armed Services, Commerce, Foreign Affairs, and Science and 
Technology and the Senate Committees on Energy and Natural Resources, Armed Services, 
and the Environment and Public Works. Act of Sept. 20, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-110, § 1, 91 
Stat. 884. 
208 See Price-Anderson Act Amendments Act of 1986, S. REP. No. 310, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 
4 (1986) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 310]. 
209 Id. Compare supra note 105. 
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of nuclear materials. 210 The Senate bill would also increase the lia-
bility of industry, strengthen the congressional commitment to pay 
for damages over and above the liability limit and provide for the 
reimbursement of states for "precautionary evacuations. "211 
The House of Representatives212 proposed reauthorizing Price-
Anderson for ten years.213 The House bill would increase industry's 
liability to a greater extent than the Senate bill, and increase the 
"maximum deferred premium"214 per accident per reactor to $63 
million, raising a fund to pay damages of $6.363 billion. 215 The House 
bill also reacts to the Court's language in Silkwood. 216 The Commit-
tee on Energy and Natural Resources determined that the punitive 
damages issue raised complex matters about which the Committee 
members could not agree.217 It therefore left the punitive damage 
issue out of the reported bill. 218 The Committee on Science and 
210 S. REP. No. 310 at 19. 
211 464 U.S. 238 (1984). See supra notes 167-203 and accompanying text. 
212 See Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1986, Part 1, H.R. REP. No. 636 [hereinafter 
Part 1]. One of the two members of the original Joint Committee on Atomic Energy still 
serving in Congress defended the Price-Anderson Act in the Committee Report and attacked 
the idea of allowing claims for punitive damages during the last session. 
It is totally inconsistent to entertain the imposition of punitive damages for behav-
ior which is wholly subject to the most stringent Federal regulations ever developed. 
The public is better served by the Price-Anderson Act than it is without it. 
Unfortunately, there will always be those who will be dissatisfied with the Price-
Anderson system. They will be dissatisfied because they know full well that the 
Price-Anderson Act plays a key role in the continuation of America's nuclear energy 
option. Some self-proclaimed "consumer groups" and "safe energy advocates" would 
rather sell-out the public for the sake of shutting down a vital industry, than work 
to improve the Price-Anderson Act within its stated goals. 
Part 1, supra, at 55 (additional views of Mr. Manuel Lujan, Jr.). 
213 [d. at 10. 
214 [d. at 15. See also S. REP. No. 310 supra note 209, at 11. The House provision would in 
effect increase private liability to roughly $6,563,000,000 per accident. [d. The Senate provision 
increases the liability cap to roughly $2,500,000,000. The House's version includes such a large 
indemnity floor that the Senate's punitive damage provision, if added to the House's 1986 bill, 
would have little effect in many conceivable disaster scenarios. See supra note 209 at 20. 
216 Part 1 supra note 212 at 15. 
216 464 U.S. 238. 
217 The Energy and Natural Resources Committee had a difficult time coming to terms on 
a punitive damages provision. The original amendment would have allowed punitive damages 
so long as the awards were not paid by insurance companies or government funds. The 
amendment would have disallowed payment of punitive damages through "either private 
financial protection or government indemnity funds .... A serious question arose, however, 
whether the amendment subjected NRC licensees and DOE contractors to unlimited liability 
for punitive damages, thereby undermining one of the primary tenets of the Act." Part 1, 
supra note 212, at 26 (emphasis added in the last clause of second sentence). 
218 [d. "Notwithstanding this action, the Committee remains opposed to punitive damage 
awards in connection with claims arising under the Price-Anderson Act because such awards 
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Technology, however, took a strong stance within the area of its 
review219 to condemn the payment of punitive damages by the gov-
ernment. 220 The Committee on Science and Technology concluded 
that the goal of punitive damages should be achieved by "civil or 
criminal penalties imposed by the Government. "221 
Since Congress has decided to support the development of nuclear 
power and has premised this decision on a complex balancing of risks 
and benefits, Congress should not be ambiguous in dealing with 
punitive damages. The regulation of the industry and the regulation 
of a subsequent disaster should work toward the same end. 
III. SUGGESTED REFORMS OF THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT 
Congress should incorporate the judicial interpretation of the 
Price-Anderson Act into any liability and indemnification amend-
ments. Three basic concerns raised by the Court need to be ad-
dressed in a punitive damages provision. First, Congress needs to 
draw a distinction between suits arising under both Price-Anderson 
and state law and suits arising solely under state law. Second, Con-
gress must determine how a plaintiff will enforce a punitive damage 
award and how these rights rank among the various claims arising 
out of the same nuclear accident. And third, Congress must establish 
the tort standard that will apply or expressly state in legislation that 
state law shall apply. 
could have the effect of diminishing the limited funds available to compensate actual injuries." 
Id. 
219 The Committee on Science and Technology's jurisdiction is limited to Department of 
Energy Contractors. Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1986-Part 2, H.R. REP. No. 636, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 4 (1986) [hereinafter Part 2]. 
22°Id. at 12. "The Committee's thirteenth amendment prohibits recovery against the gov-
ernment .... Besides the fact that punitive damages could result in very large awards paid 
by the government for non-physical damages, the Committee does not believe the federal 
government should ... pay punitive damages for any purpose." Id. 
221 I d. at 13. 
If a person's actions constitute legal malice, that is, if the person intended to cause 
an accident, then those individuals should be punished by civil or criminal penalties 
assessed by the government and not by penalties ultimately assessed against the 
government . . . . 
The fourteenth Committee amendment [to the Act] requires the Secretary of 
Energy to report to the Congress on the civil and criminal liability of any contractor 
or other person indemnified for intentionally causing, or attempting to cause, a 
nuclear accident .... If existing authority is insufficient, the Secretary is directed 
to make recommendations to the Congress in his report . . . . 
Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
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A. Awarding Punitive Damages in Cases Involving Price-
Anderson Versus Cases Not Involving Price-Anderson 
For nuclear accidents that do not fall under the definition of an 
extraordinary nuclear occurrence and do not result in damages which 
exceed the overall liability cap, punitive damages should be assessed 
and levied under existing state law. Congress should not protect the 
nuclear power industry from the state's police power when the ac-
cident falls below the level of federal financial involvement as defined 
by Price-Anderson. This policy neither frustrates the federal regu-
latory structure nor has been preempted by Congress' statutory 
scheme for promoting, regulating, and controlling a private nuclear 
industry. This conclusion is justifiable based on the legislative history 
of Price-Anderson, the Supreme Court's holding in Silkwood, and 
the logical differences between punitive jury awards and regulatory 
enforcement fines. 
Punitive damages arise when the defendant's behavior has been 
intentional and deliberate and has the characteristics of an out-
rage. 222 The payment of damages in such cases is far more than a 
fine. The plaintiff is being paid for an intangible injury that is oth-
erwise non-compensable. 223 Regulatory violations occur due to an 
objective failure to comply with a given regulation. Courts, on the 
other hand, base punitive damage awards on the courts' subjective 
level of a defendant's responsibility for the harm.224 
A system of apportionment among plaintiffs awarded punitive 
damages is necessary if the damages from a nuclear accident reach 
the federal liability cap.225 Evidence shows a number of scenarios226 
where damages above the liability cap can occur without reaching 
the designation of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. 227 Without 
this designation, the utility would waive no defenses, and the suit 
could be treated under appropriate state law. The resulting punitive 
award from an accident with damages above the liability cap, but 
which is not deemed an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, should be 
apportioned among all victims regardless of their standing to bring 
222 W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS, 9, 11, 14 (1984). 
223 [d. 
224 [d. 
225 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982). 
226 See generally Meyer, supra note 12. 
227 It is assumed that suits arising out of nuclear accidents would be best filed as class 
actions under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), thus necessitating a shared judgment. 
1987] PRICE-ANDERSON ACT 557 
a punitive damages claim. 228 Furthermore, the punitive damage 
claim should be paid by the utility, not the federal government. 229 
When the damages for a nuclear accident exceed the Price-Anderson 
Act's liability cap, Congress should allow these damages to be as-
sessed against the utility itself, and should provide for a scheme of 
distributing the punitive damages among the victims. This result is 
not mandated by the Supreme Court's holding in Silkwood. The 
holding in that case would, in fact, probably result in no punitive 
damages being paid when damages exceed the liability cap, and thus 
Congress should codify a punitive damage rule to prevent such a 
result. The federal government's role should be limited to establish-
ing a procedure for enforcement and a timetable for payment of 
punitive damages through the NRC. As the federal agency respon-
sible for regulating the nuclear industry, the NRC is in the best 
position to act as trustee for claimants suing an interstate industry. 
The complex balancing of the rights and responsibilities within 
federal nuclear power policy makes the apportionment of punitive 
damages necessary. First, it is difficult to imagine that one plaintiff 
in the class of injured parties would have a distinct claim based upon 
punitive standards. Second, regardless of the nexus of the claim, 
Congress has clearly determined that the potential costs of nuclear 
power are to be shared by all members of society.230 To the extent 
possible, punitive damages must be awarded to avoid profit-making 
by a claimant. A punitive award should be allocated as if it were a 
compensatory award under Price-Anderson.231 
Such an allocation of the benefits achieves two goals: fairness in 
the allocation of the defendant's assets, and the weeding out of claims 
228 The class bringing suit should not benefit at the expense of the class of latent-injury 
victims, who would not suffer actual damages for a number of years following an accident. 
The punitive damages should be collectable through enforcement only after all justifiable 
compensatory claims are awarded and payment systems for those judgments secured. The 
punitive award then would become a de facto element of a compensatory award to victims 
suffering latent injuries and death due to the accident. 
229 See Part 2, supra note 100, at 12. 
Id. 
Punitive damages are intangible damages which are recoverable at the discretion of 
the jury or the judge in a non-jury trial. Besides the fact that punitive damages could 
result in very large awards paid by the government for non-physical damages, the 
Committee does not believe that the federal government should, as a rule pay punitive 
damages for any purpose. 
230 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1982). 
231 This protection includes the apportionment of the award as well as any other action 
Congress agrees to take in the event of an accident involving damages in excess of the statutory 
cap. See 42 U.S.C. § 221O(e) (1982). 
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based upon greed. The fairness in allocating benefits to all is in 
keeping with the Act's principle of allocating costs to all members 
of society.232 Spurious claims are avoided by removing the claimant's 
incentive to sue. Thus, risk and benefit continue to be spread equi-
tably and utilities need not fear nuisance suits asking for punitive 
damages. 
B. Exposing the Utilities to Liability for Culpable Behavior 
The federal government has stated its reluctance to expose a 
utility to unlimited liability in compensatory damage suits, and thus 
is leery of opening utilities up to unlimited liability in punitive dam-
age suits. 233 This makes no sense, however, when one considers that 
the public is exposed to uncompensable injury and damages following 
a nuclear accident, injury that the industry should pay for when its 
behavior reaches a high level of culpability. If Congress' sole goal 
were to promote nuclear power, then congressional concern about 
liability for culpable harm would be logical. 234 As the law now stands, 
the lack of financial risk being borne by industry, which would pro-
mote a utility's interest in security and safety, increases the risk to 
the American public without enhancing the viability of nuclear en-
ergy. 
In situations where the Nuclear Regulatory Commission declares 
a nuclear accident an extraordinary nuclear occurrence,235 a change 
in the statute must be made. The waiver of defenses should not 
232Id. See generally Meyer supra note 12. 
233 The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs applied this logic in stating: 
The Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment approved an amendment that 
would have prohibited use of either private financial protection or government in-
demnity funds available under the Act to pay punitive damage awards. The purpose 
of this amendment was to prevent the limited funds available for compensating actual 
injuries from being used to pay punitive awards. A serious question arose, however, 
whether the amendment subjected NRC licensees . . . to unlimited liability for 
punitive damages, thereby undermining one of the primary tenets of the Act. 
Part 1 supra note 212, at 26. But Congress never agreed to protect utilities from any 
responsibility for their actions in order to promote nuclear power. Congress' policy of pro-
moting nuclear generated electricity does not mean Congress agreed to protect utilities from 
suits arising out of their own culpability. 
234 The Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs added language in its bill H. R. 3653 
requiring Congress to shoulder the burden of paying damages above the liability cap: 
[T]he Congress will thoroughly review the particular incident ... and take whatever 
action is determined to be necessary (including approval of appropriate compensa-
tion plans and appropriation of funds) to provide full and prompt compensation to 
the public for all public liability claims resulting from a disaster of such magnitude. 
Part 1 supra note 212, at 44 (emphasis added). 
235 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982). 
1987] PRICE-ANDERSON ACT 559 
apply to claims for punitive damages in this situation. The waiver of 
defenses would make an accurate allocation of fault impossible and 
would take too much power away from the jury. Punitive damage 
awards, by law based upon findings of fault or culpability, cannot be 
awarded without the defendant presenting to the jury defenses ex-
plaining why its behavior is not punishable. 
c. A Model Statutory Provision 
Punitive Damages 
(a) Nothing in this act shall be construed to limit awards for punitive 
damages based upon state tort law provided that the damages are 
proved to be the result of gross negligence, malfeasance, nonfeasance 
or wilful misconduct. 
(b) No punitive damage award may be granted unless-
(i) no part of the punitive damage award is paid by a private 
insuror or by the federal government, and; 
(ii) the amount of the award is set aside in trust for victims of a 
nuclear incident who suffer from latent injuries, or injuries based on 
early and chronic radiation doses that have a latency of up to ten 
years followed by a period of risk for the remainder of the victim's 
life and for injuries such as genetic defects; still births and miscar-
riages caused by radiation induced injury, but not limited to the 
injuries enumerated. 
(c) Damage awards for the class of plaintiffs suffering from latent 
injuries shall be made up of a pro rata share of the punitive damage 
fund, if any exists, and federal indemnification funds or money from 
the defendant nuclear industry or facility to make up the difference 
between the amount of the punitive damage trust share allocated to 
each victim provided that the total amount awarded does not exceed 
the pro rata compensatory award amount awarded and allocated 
[pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2210] to early fatality, early injury and 
early property damage claimants in any original litigation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If the nuclear industry is allowed to continue in its present form, 
the Price-Anderson Act must remain an element of United States 
policy. The Act, however, can only meet its two-part goal of pro-
tecting the public and promoting the nuclear industry if the industry 
is made expressly liable for punitive damages arising out of gross 
negligence or wilful misconduct. Industry, not the federal govern-
ment or private insurance companies, must be responsible for paying 
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punitive damage awards. Using a punitive damage award fund to 
pay for latent injuries that develop over the long term will eliminate 
suits brought for short term gain by persons injured soon after an 
accident, and will create a source of payment for damages arising 
years after an accident. The increased costs to ratepayers created 
by a punitive damage provision would reflect more accurately the 
cost of the power that they receive. The similar effect on utility 
stockholders would encourage discussion on the viability of nuclear 
power. Having these costs borne by the people benefiting from the 
power is an important step in broadening the number of factors used 
to decide whether to invest in nuclear power. 
